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Respondent Melodee Armfield, by and through her attorneys of record, submit this
Respondent's Brief in response to Appellant Raymond Roles' Brief on appeal in this matter.

I.

STATE1\1ENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises out of the denial of an inmate's internal appeal of a Disciplinary
Offense Report. It is undisputed that the Appellant, Raymond Roles ("Roles") filed his Prisoner
Civil Rights Complaint (CR 000004-000020), alleging that his disciplinary conviction was a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection (See, 000008). Roles argued that
his rights were violated when the Disciplinary Hearing Officer, Respondent, Melodee Armfield
("Armfield") failed to dismiss his Disciplinary Offense Report for Aggravated Assault based upon
his defense of self-defense, which he argued that he was entitled to under Idaho statute.
The district court correctly granted Armfield's motion for summary judgment (CR
000030-000031), holding that despite Armfield's extensive briefing on the subject, Roles failed to
raise a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Instead, the district court found that Roles had
only raised a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, however, the district court dismissed
this claim, finding that Roles failed to support that claim by showing that he was a member of a
protected class.
Further, Roles has appealed the district court's granting of summary judgment because
he was denied an opportunity to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, Roles argued that the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure required the Judge to issue a transport order allowing him to be physically
present to argue Respondent's summary judgment motion. The district court heard Roles' objection,
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and denied Roles' motion on the basis that a prisoner who initiates a civil suit has no absolute right
to be transferred from the prison to appear personally at the courthouse to argue against summary
judgment, and that security and cost concerns weighed against it. Roles then made an oral motion
for disqualification, which was denied after a lengthy explanation by the court. The hearing
proceeded with Roles appearing by way of telephone. The transcript of the hearing reflects that
Roles was allowed to present an extensive argument by way of pre-hearing briefing, and testimony
at the hearing by way of telephone, and at no time did he complain on the record that he could not
hear the judge or Respondent's counsel.

B.

Statement of the Facts and Procedural Background.

On May 4, 2010, a Disciplinary Offense Report was filed, charging Roles with
Aggravated Battery:
On 4/20/10 at 1610 hours Inmate Roles, Raymond, 14482 was involved
in a physical altercation in V pod in the area of cell 03. Inmate Roles was
approached by another inmate in cell 03 and the two began to argue.
Inmate Roles stuck the other inmate in the left side of his jaw with a
pencil which broke during the incident. Inmate Roles began to argue with
the other inmate and the two then began to exchange punches with closed
fists and wrestled on the floor of the pod.
(CR 000018) A Disciplinary Hearing was held on May 5, 2010, at which Armfield, acting as the
Hearing Officer, confirmed the offense and sanctioned the Roles to seventeen (17) days of detention
time. (Id.)
Roles appealed internally on the theory that,
I have a right under Idaho Code to self defense, to protect my self against
any perceived attack. I have a right to do that which I deem necessary to
end that attack/assault. Hearing officer's opinion that pencil was excessive
is wrong.
(CR. 000017)

Armfield responded as follows:
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Other inmate in the situation did not have a weapon. You attacked with
a weapon & attacked in such a manner that your intent was to cause great
bodily injury up to & including death based upon the area of the other
inmates body that you struck with the weapon. Decision stands.
(CR. 000017) Warden Wengler reviewed and affirmed Armfield's decision. (Id.)
Roles claimed, and Armfield did not contest, that as a result of the disciplinary action,
his custody level was raised and he was moved to close custody for five years. (CR 000020)
On August 30, 2010, Roles filed his Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint, alleging that his
disciplinary conviction was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. (CR
000004-000020) Specifically, he claimed:
Defendant did violated (sic) my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection
of the law. Plaintiff has the right to protect himself against unlawful
assault and attack pursuant (sic) Idaho Code 16-3-22(a), 16-3-23. I have
the right to use such force as is necessary to stop any unlawful assault and
attack. No state agency can have rule, regulation or policy which is in
conflict with this (sic) code sections 19-13-1 and 19-15-1. My right is
protected under United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
State of Idaho, and the laws of Idaho. 16-3-22 -16-3-23(1).
(CR 000004)
On March 4, 2011, a summary judgment hearing was held. (CR, 000002; RT pg. 9,
lines 24-25, and pg. 10, lines 7.) Appellee's Counsel appeared in person, and Appellant appeared
telephonically, as a result of the Court's denial of his Objection to Defendant's Notice of Hearing and
Request for Transport Order. (RT, pg. 10, lines 19-25, and pg. 11, line 1.)
During oral argument, Roles objected to the Disciplinary Audio Tape of his disciplinary
hearing that was attached to Appellee's attorney's affidavit, stating:
Through the writing, I've raised issues both of - the credibility issue,
whether or not I was raised - allowed to argue Idaho law in my - in my
disciplinary hearing, which I was not, which they claim I was. Also, I've
raised the possibility, since I've not heard this audio tape that these - that
the - that the defendant has raised, whether or not it's a - a proper
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recording or not because I have not heard it. So, I've raised a credibility
issue as well.
(RT, pg. 23, lines 1-9). The district court agreed with Roles' objection, stating," ... the Court will
sustain the Plaintiffs objection as it relates to the contents of the recording and the contents of the
recording will not be considered by this Court for purposes of summary judgment." (CR 000081)
Additionally, the Court held that:
Defendant has argued extensive! y that the requirements of due process are
satisfied if "some evidence" supports the prison disciplinary action.
However, a review of Plaintiffs Prisoner Civil Rights Complaints shows
that the Plaintiff has not made a due process claim. Rather, the sole claim
made by the Plaintiff is that Defendant "violated my 14th Amend. Right
to equal protection of the law" and the Court only need address that
claim.
(CR 000081) The Court then denied Roles' equal protection claim, holding:
Plaintiff Roles has not argued that he is a member of a protected class or
of any class at all. Rather, the Plaintiffs arguments focus on the fact that
the Defendant did not accept the Plaintiffs (with the Plaintiff situated as
an individual and not as a member of a group) defense of self-defense,
and whether the Plaintiff as an individual intended great bodily harm ...
. Plaintiff Roles does not mention any class, suspect or not, in any of his
filings or arguments made in this case. Therefore, this Court need not
consider self-defense as a defense in a prisoner disciplinary setting as it
applies to a prisoner as a class.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as nonmoving party, the Plaintiff cannot prevail in his equal protection claim
because he has not alleged a deliberate plan of discrimination based on
some unjustifiable classification. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
(CR 000082)
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II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court correctly find that Roles failed to raise a due process

2.

Even if Roles would have properly pled a due process claim, his claim would

claim?

have failed because no liberty interest was established.
3.

Did the District Court correctly find that Roles failed to plead a Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claim?
4.

Did the District Court correctly find that Roles does not have an absolute due

process right to appear in person at summary judgment hearing?
5.

Did the District Court abuse it's discretion In denying Role's Motion to

Disqualify?

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review utilized by
this Court is the same standard used by the district court in initially ruling on the Motion.
Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c),

summary judgment is to be rendered to the moving party if "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In considering
summary judgment the Court liberally construes all facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. A&J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 (2005).
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In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party may not rest
on allegations in the pleadings, but must produce evidence by affidavit or deposition to contradict
the assertions of the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176 (1974). A
non-moving party may not rely on general or conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts,
particularly where opposing affidavits set forth specific and otherwise uncontroverted facts.
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902 (1997). Rather, a party must provide factual details of

specificity equal to those furnished by his opponent. Bob Daniels and Son v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,
541 (1984). "A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact for the purpose of summary judgment." Finholt v. Cresto, 143
Idaho 894, 897 (2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, even disputed facts will not defeat summary
judgment when the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential element of his
or her case, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988), or when a plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case on which he or she bears the burden of proof. State v. Shama Res. Ltd. P 'Ship, 127 Idaho
267, 270 (1955).
B.

The District Court Correctly Found That Roles did not Raise a Due
Process Claim.

The district court found that "a review of Plaintiffs Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint
shows that the Plaintiff has not made a due process claim. Rather, the sole claim made by the
Plaintiff is that Defendant "violated my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection of the law" and that
the Court need only address that claim." (See, CR 000081) The district court correctly recognized
that Roles only specified the following equal protection claim in his Complaint:
Defendant did violated (sic) my 14th Amend. Right to equal protection
of the law. Plaintiff has the right to protect himself against unlawful
assault and attack pursuant (sic) Idaho Code 16-3-22(a), 16-3-23. I have
the right to use such force as is necessary to stop any unlawful assault and
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6.

attack. No state agency can have rule, regulation or policy which is in
conflict with this (sic) code sections 19-13-1 and 19-15-1. My right is
protected under United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
State ofldaho, and the laws ofldaho. 16-3-22 -16-3-23(1).
(CR 000004) The record reflects that Roles argued only that his Fourteenth Amendment right of
equal protection was violated when the Disciplinary Hearing Officer did not dismiss his Disciplinary
Offense Report pursuant to Idaho statutes recognizing self-defense as a defense available to free
individuals charged of criminal aggravated assault.

C.

Even if Roles Would Have Properly Plead a Due Process Claim, His
Claim Would Have Failed Because No Liberty Interest was Established.

In the event that the Court finds that Roles did in fact allege that his due process rights
were violated, Roles's claim would have failed for lack of a liberty interest.
The due process guarantees derived from the United States Constitution and the Idaho
Constitution are substantially the same (Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275,
1277 (Ct. App. 2007), mandating that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. 14th Am.; Idaho Constitution. Art. I, § 13. In order to
determine whether an individual's due process rights have been violated, the Court must engage in
a two-step analysis: first, it must decide whether the individual's deprived interest is a liberty or
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d
603, 605 (1996). This requires a finding of actual, substantive deprivation of a right. Often in this
analysis the first step is mistakenly assumed and/or skipped completely, with the liberty interest
mistakenly defined as the lack of procedures provided prior to the deprivation. See, Cleveland Bd.

of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995). Only after the court finds an actual liberty or property
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interest deprivation exists will the court reach the next step, in which it determines the extent of due
process procedural protections which should have been afforded. Id.
Due process, particularly "procedural due process," is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481,
92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484,494 (1972); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, at 402, 973
P.2d 749 at 754 (Ct.App. 1999). Whether an individual has a liberty interest largely depends on the
status of the individual. For example, if the individual is incarcerated, his/her liberties and those
corresponding protections have been severely limited as a result of the prior criminal proceedings.
Lighter v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712, 239 P.3d 817 (Ct.App. 2010); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.

126,131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2167, 156 L.Ed.2d 162, 169-70 (2003). While it has been recognized that
"prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate," lawful incarceration necessitates
withdrawal or limitation of may privileges and rights; "a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995)
(internal quotations omitted). Indeed, "[t]he very object of imprisonment is confinement[;]" thus
"[m]any of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the
prisoner." Lightner, supra. Often it is the case that discipline by prison officials "falls within the
expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by the court of law" without violating any liberty or
property interests. Id.
Accordingly, when analyzing due process and a liberty interest in the context of the
punishment of incarcerated prisoners, the question often becomes whether the discipline represents
"the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest." Sandin, supra. At issue in Sandin was an inmate's assertion that he had been deprived of
procedural due process because he was not allowed to call witnesses in a prison discipline hearing.
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Id. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the petitioner was claiming that the lack of procedural due
process was a deprivation of liberty, which the court found an erroneous, underlying assumption.
Sandin rejected the proposition that any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 484. Instead, it held that punishment of a
prisoner neither imposes retribution in lieu of a valid conviction nor maintains physical control over
otherwise free citizens, but rather "effectuates prison management and prison rehabilitative goals,"
and "falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Id. at 485.
Sandin additionally holds that, for prisoners, any liberty interest that is protected by the
Due Process Clause is generally limited to an interest in freedom from restraint which "imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Id., at 484. The Sandin Court was clear to stress that suits questioning proper procedures for internal
discipline matters increased judicial interference in day-to-day prison operation and rarely involved
traditional due process concerns. Id. at 483-484. In other words, it was the ultimate deprivation
(which was disciplinary segregation in this case and in Sandin) which courts are to focus on, not the
procedures or lack of procedures used. Only after the disciplinary action is found to be an atypical
and significant hardship, as opposed to the "ordinary incidents of prison life," does the court satisfy
the first prong of the inquiry, and find a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 472, 2295. In Sandin, the
inmate had not shown the initial deprivation of a liberty interest that was entitled to protection
through adequate procedural safeguards in the disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 485-86, 2301; Nelson
v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619, 67 P.3d 98 (Ct.App. 2003).
In Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized and adopted the holding in Sandin. In that case, a prisoner alleged that his due process
rights were violated at a disciplinary hearing for a charge of possession because he was denied a staff
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representative for the hearing and the evidence (the drugs) was not brought to the hearing. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court specifically recognized and applied the "atypical and significant hardship"
standard used in Sandin, and held it applicable to Art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Scheve rs,
930 P.2d at 607. Applying this standard, the Schevers court concluded the petitioner did not have
a liberty interest under the Idaho Constitution's Due Process Clause. Id.
However, this conclusion was not ground-breaking Idaho legal precedent. In multiple
previous cases Idaho had recognized that an inmate has no liberty interest or right to counsel in penal
committee hearings. See Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 348-49, 64 7 P.2d 796, 804-05 (Ct. App.
1982); State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 775 P.2d 158 (Ct.App. 1989). Thus, under Sandin,

Schevers, Schmidt, Hanslovan, and other cases, a prisoner cannot state a due process claim arising
out of a disciplinary proceeding unless he suffers an" atypical and significant hardship ... in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; Schevers, 930 P.2d at 607.

In Sandin, thirty (30 days in disciplinary segregation did not rise to the level of such
a hardship; in Schevers, fifty-five (55) days in disciplinary segregation did not. In this case, Roles
has submitted a copy of his Disciplinary Offense Report which shows that he was sentenced to
seventeen days of segregation (See, CR 000018), as well as a copy of his Idaho Department of
Correction Reclassification Score Sheet which shows that following his conviction, his custody level
was raised to close-custody for five years. (See, CR 000020) By comparison to the above case
examples, Roles' punishments are insufficient to be recognized as "atypical and significant," and thus
fail to rise to the level of a deprivation underlying a due process claim. Further, an increase in an
inmate's security classification does not impose an atypical hardship in relation to ordinary prison
life. It is well-established that the Due Process Clause itself does not afford a prisoner a liberty
interest in his or her security classification. Hewittv. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-
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70, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Meyer v. Reno, 911 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1996); see also, Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (no liberty interest in particular prison
assignment)

Indeed, as a matter of course, inmates receive regular classification reviews.

Adjustments (both upward and downward) to one's security classification are routine and predictable
events in the life of an incarcerated felon. Thus, Roles' reclassification to close custody following
the Disciplinary Offense Report does not present "the type of atypical, significant deprivation in
which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, at 2301. Therefore, this court
must conclude that Roles did not have any liberty interest that would entitle him to due process
protection.
Additionally, only "some evidence" is required to support a Disciplinary Offense
Report. The U.S. Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 ( 1985), held that a prison
disciplinary action must be affirmed if there is "some evidence" to support the result. Hill, 472 U.S.
at 455. This "some evidence" standard was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cootz v. State,
117 Idaho 38, 40, 785 P.2d 163, 165 (1989), as referenced in Schevers: "... We are persuaded the
"some evidence rule" formulated by the Supreme Court in Hill is the appropriate one for use to

adopt in prison disciplinary cases." Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 41, 785 P.2d 163, 166 (1989).
When considering the relevance of the "some evidence" rule to this case, it is important to remember
that Hill and Cootz were decided before Sandin at a time when case law had developed which
entitled prisoners to certain procedural due process in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The
"some evidence" standard was part of this development.

However, it only applies if a

constitutionally protected interest is at issue to begin with.
In establishing the "some evidence" standard, the Supreme Court stated:
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... This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the
conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced ... " United
States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of /migration, 273 U.S. at 106,
47 S.Ct. At 304. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid,
United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133-134, 44 S.Ct. 260,
260-261, 68 L.Ed.2d 590 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018
(CA8 1974). We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard
as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take
place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must
often act swiftly on the basis of the evidence that might be insufficient in
less exigent circumstances. See, Wo(ff, 418 U.S. at 562-563, 567-569, 94
S.Ct. at 2977-2978, 2980-2981. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of
prison administrators that have some basis in fact.
Superintendent v. Hill, 4 72 U.S. at 456. This standard does not require that prison staff necessarily
be right. It requires only some evidence to support the sanction. Here, Roles was afforded a hearing.
By the Roles' own admission, he admits to fighting with another inmate, and hitting that inmate with
a pencil, although Roles characterizes the fighting as self-defense. (See CR 000006) "A DOR
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding with a beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. The
finer point of whether a battery charge would be defeated by the defense of self defense in a criminal
action is not relevant in a DOR setting, given that some evidence of guilt was presented at the DOR
hearing." Cutler v. Guyer, 2010 WL 3735689 *8 CD.Idaho 2010)

While Roles has reasons

supporting all of his actions, they are not necessarily valid reasons when considering the overall
security concerns of the institution. In any event, the DOR hearing officer and reviewing authority
clearly had "some" evidence upon which to base their decision. It cannot be said that their decision
was "without a shred of evidence" or arbitrary or capricious, that is, having no substantial relation
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to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Cutler v. Guyer, 2010 WL 3735689 *9 (D.Idaho
2010)
Roles' admissions are enough to support an aggravated battery charge under the "some"
evidence standard as applied to the applicable IDOC definition of the offense of Aggravated Battery
at the time of the disciplinary hearing. However, Roles has raised the issue of whether Armfield's
counsel submitted accurate records to the district court, which were wrongly relied upon in the
district court's granting of summary judgment. Specifically, Roles contends that the ICC policy
submitted together with the Affidavit of James Stoll which defined the inmate offense of Aggravated
Battery was outdated.
The Affidavit of James Stoll was submitted to the district court in support of the
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (CR 000032-000059) Attached to the Affidavit was
ICC Policy 15-100, which indicated that "[i]t is the policy of the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC)
to follow the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) Directive 318.02.01.001, Disciplinary
Procedures ... " (CR 000037) The effective date of this policy was June 27, 2005. (ld.) Included
with this policy was a document entitled, Category of Offenses, identifies on its face that it is an
attachment to Directive 318, last revised on September 24, 2003. (Id.) This document defined the
inmate offense of Aggravated Battery as follows:
Aggravated Battery.
Example: Battery causes great bodily harm; or permanent disability; or
permanent disfigurement; or uses a deadly weapon or instrument; or uses
any vitriol, corrosive acid, or a caustic chemical of any nature; or uses any
poison or other noxious or destructive substance or liquid; or upon the
person of a pregnant female causes great bodily harm, permanent
disability, or permanent disfigurement to an embryo or fetus.
(See CR00050) The district court quoted the above definition in its factual background section of

the Memorandum Decision and Order. (See CR 000079)
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In support of Roles' objection to the inclusion of the above definition, Roles points out
that he attached a competing document defining Aggravated Assault to his Answer and Objection
to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. (See CR 000076). This section defines the offense
of Aggravated Battery as follows:
Wilful and unlawful use of physical force, chemical, poison, weapon or
other destructive substance upon another person that intentionally causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement, or
upon a pregnant woman causing great bodily harm, permanent disability
or permanent disfigurement to an embryo or fetus.
(See CR000076) However, on it's face, the document submitted by Roles fails to rebut the policy

submitted with the Affidavit of James R. Stoll. Rule 56( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states
in pertinent part,
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
the party.
Here, Roles' competing document was submitted as an attachment to Roles' briefing, and not by
affidavit, and therefore, lacks foundation. Additionally, the document submitted by Roles does not
show any indication that it supercedes the policy document attached to the Affidavit of James R.
Stoll.
Further, in support of his argument, Roles' has attached a copy of the most recent
revision of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) Directive 318.02.01.001, Disciplinary
Offense Codes, as Appendix A to his Appellant Brief. Armfield objects to the inclusion of this
document on the basis that it is not part of the Clerk's Record. However, even if the Court allows
this document, it only proves that the policy definition attached to the Affidavit of James R. Stoll
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is correct. Roles has been nice enough to circle at the bottom of the page of this new exhibit
information clarifying that these definitions were last updated on March 15, 2010 (ten days after
Roles' disciplinary hearing). Therefore, there is no question of fact as to whether the definition of
Aggravated Assault as submitted by the Respondent via the Affidavit of James R. Stoll, and later
cited by the district court was the applicable definition at the time of Roles's disciplinary hearing.
Because Roles has not suffered an actual, substantive deprivation of liberty, the district
court did not need to address all of Roles' underlying claims, including the issue regarding whether
Roles was given the opportunity to fully articulate his self-defense argument at the disciplinary
hearing. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Prior to
reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for
decision.") (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985)).

D.

The District Court Correctly Found That Roles Failed to Show That He
was a Member of a Protected Class in Support of His Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Claim.

The district court denied Roles' Equal Protection claim, holding:
Plaintiff Roles has not argued that he is a member of a protected class or
of any class at all. Rather, the Plaintiffs arguments focus on the fact that
the Defendant did not accept the Plaintiffs (with the Plaintiff situated as
an individual and not as a member of a group) defense of self-defense,
and whether the Plaintiff as an individual intended great bodily harm ...
. Plaintiff Roles does not mention any class, suspect or not, in any of his
filings or arguments made in this case. Therefore, this Court need not
consider self-defense as a defense in a prisoner disciplinary setting as it
applies to a prisoner as a class.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as nonmoving party, the Plaintiff cannot prevail in his equal protection claim
because he has not alleged a deliberate plan of discrimination based on
some unjustifiable classification. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (CR 000082)
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"[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure
every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060
(2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Equal protection claims alleging disparate treatment or classification are subject to a
heightened standard of scrutiny when they involve a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, such as race
or national origin, or when they involve a burden on the exercise of fundamental personal rights
protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Otherwise, equal protection claims are subject to a
rational basis inquiry. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257
(1993).
Roles' argument appears to be that Idaho statutes create a protected "prisoner" class for
equal protection purposes, and that prisons must give prisoners the benefit of the criminal selfdefense statute when determining prison administrative discipline. However, there is no legal
support for Roles' arguments.

Because it is well established that prisoners do not constitute a

suspect or quasi-suspect class, Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9 th Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
Phillip v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9 th Cir. 1997), the district court correctly recognized that

Roles' made no assertion in his Complaint or his briefing that he was treated any differently than any
other prisoner by Armfield. Because the record is devoid of any facts showing a deprivation of
Roles' equal protection rights, there was no need for the district court to reach the constitutional
issue, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment. See Meinhold v. United States
Dep't of Def, 34 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9 th Cir. 1994) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions,
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federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for decision.") (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472
U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985)).

E.

Inmates Who Initiate Civil Actions Do Not Have an Absolute Due
Process Right to be Present at Summary Judgment Hearings, and Judge
Neville did not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Roles' Motion to
Disqualify.

Roles has asserted that the Judge's decision to deny his request to be present in the
courtroom for the summary judgment hearing violated his due process rights. He has also asserted
that the judge's deviation from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was grounds for disqualification.
On March 4, 2011 a hearing on Armfield's Motion for Summary Judgment was held
before Judge Neville. (CR, 000002; RT pg. 9, lines 24-25, and pg. 10, lines 7.) At beginning of
the hearing, Judge Neville stated:
... I have seen the Objection to Defendant's Notice of Hearing and
Request for Transfer Order, filed January 3, 2011. (RT, pg. 10, lines, 2123.)That has been effectively denied because the Court did not enter a
transport order and Mr. Roles is participating telephonically.
(RT, pg. 10, lines 24-25, and pg. 11, line 1.)
Upon defense counsel starting his oral argument, Judge Neville stopped and said, "Mr.
Roles, can you hear Mr. Stoll?" (RT, pg. 12, lines 2-3) Mr. Roles responded by stating:
Yeah. I can - I can hear, Your Honor, but I'm gonna - be raising a further
objection to this telephonic hearing pursuant to Rule 7(B)(4)(a), which
explicitly states that we can't be holding a telephonic or - or video
hearing in a motion for summary judgment unless both parties stipulate.
So, I would be raising a further objection.
(RT, pg. 12, lines 4-10) Judge Neville responded by stating, "Yeah. I'm going to overrule your
objection, sir. You don't get a ride to town every time you file a motion. That's just the bottom line.
So, I'll overrule the objection." (RT, pg. 12, lines 11-14.)
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Roles responded by stating, "then I'm gonna - I'm gonna also - then I'm gonna move
for a disqualification of the judge for - for cause - ... (RT, pg. 12, lines 18-20) pursuant to Rule
40. That would be 40(D)(2)(a), I believe (a)(4)." (RT, pg. 12, lines 22-23) Roles then explained,
"the- the thing about cause, Your Honor, is I didn't have cause until right now." (RT, pg. 13, lines
11-13) Judge Neville responded,
Oh, I see. So, your - your cause is the first time you lose a motion, a
preliminary motion, that's your cause? You're going to file - your going
to move to disqualify any judge that rules against you even (RT, pg. 13,
lines 18) ... on a ... (RT, pg. 13, line 20) ....
Roles then interrupted Judge Neville:
No. But in this particular case, Your Honor, the - the - the - the
Supreme Court makes our - makes our rules, if I'm - if I'm correct in
saying that, So, the - so, the Idaho Supreme Court has said that a motion
for summary judgment is not proper in ... (RT, pg. 13, lines 21-25) this
unless both - unless both parties stipulate. I'm only attempting to follow
the rules and - and go by the law.
(RT, pg. 14, lines 1-3). Judge Neville then allowed Roles to argue his motion. (RT, pg. 14, lines
6-8). Roles argued the following:
Well, Your Honor, as I've stipulated, Rule 7 says that - that this can't
happen. So, I have to say for cause because you're prejudiced against me
and - and biased for the - for the defendant in this case. There - there
can't be any other reason. I mean, a law is a law, the rule is the rule. If
we're - if we're gonna hold a legal hearing, then - then it has to be legal
pursuant to Idaho law and pursuant to Idaho Rules pertaining to motion
for summary judgment.
(RT, pg. 14, lines 9-18) In denying Roles' motion, Judge Neville stated the following:
The Court's had the opportunity to review a Civil Rule, I presume, which
would apply to the - a civil case such as this, Rule 7(B)(4), as I
understood the defendant [verbatim] to say. I thought he said 7(B)( 4)(A);
I don't see a part A to that. But in (RT, pg. 15, lines 21-25) any event it
talks about hearings that may be held by telephone or video conferencing.
(RT, pg. 16, lines 1-2.)
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Frankly, the- the Court is aware I I don't know Mr. Roles personally,
I don't think I've ever had him in the courtroom but he's in custody for
some very serious offenses that, as the Court recalls, may include major
sex offenses such as rape and penetration by a foreign object, and at least
one other matter.
(RT, pg. 16, lines, 3-8)

So, I think it's a it's a security situation for this Court to authorize an
inmate to be brought from the prison into court for a civil matter, which
he has initiated. It it is not a matter of right for an inmate who is
serving a very long sentence, as I recall a life sentence, to be brought to
court each and every time on a civil matter which they bring, whether or
not the matter has any merit.
(RT, pg. 16, lines 9-16)
So, what I'm going to say is that as a matter of course, this Court does not
routinely, in every case involving long long sentence, high security
inmates, bring them to court for civil matters which they initiate. I don't
- that isn't about being discriminating against mister or biased against
Mr. Roles; I'm not. I don't think I've ever met Mr. Roles. I'm not aware
of ever have having had him in my courtroom, and I was not the judge
that handled his (RT, pg. 16, lines 17-25) case all those years ago, even
though I've been around long enough to have done that.
(RT, pg. 17, lines 1-2)
So, I don't think it's a an issue of bias when the Court does not authorize
the defendant to be brought from the institution into - into civil court and
incur that expense, frankly, every time an inmate files a civil matter or
initiates a civil case, which Mr. Roles has done in this case. And - and
just because the Court has rules or did not grant his motion to be
transported here does not mean the Court is biased against him.
(RT, pg. 17, lines 3-11)
Again, I don't believe I know Mr. Roles from Adam frankly, but I am
aware of his background and why he's there because that's a a matter
that the Court should be familiar with if I'm going to handle a case from
an inmate.
(RT, pg. 17, lines 12-16)
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So, I'm going to deny the motion for disqualification for cause because
Mr. Roles has simply not stated any cause, and this Court knows of no
basis for granting the motion.
(RT, pg. 17, lines 17-20)
The essence of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424, U.S. 319,333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976);
Boddiev. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,378, 91, S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, (1971); Sweitzerv. Dean,
118 Idaho 568,573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990). Decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish
that the constitutional protection extends to prisoners, and affords them a limited right of access to
the courts, to challenge their convictions or their confinement and to pursue actions for violations
of their civil rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 82197 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 E.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
This does not mean, however, that an inmate has an absolute right to be personally
present at trial in civil litigation. Rather, "[d]ue process is a flexible constitutional principle and calls
for such procedural protection as the particular situation demands." In re Baby Doe, 130 Idaho 4 7
at 50, 936 P.2d 690 at 693(Ct.App. 1997) See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d
1230 (1961), the United States Supreme Court explained:
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation....
[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of
the government function involved as well as of the private interest that
has been affected by government action.
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In Baby Doe, an incarcerated father applied to the magistrate court for a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum requiring that he be transported to the disciplinary hearing in an action
brought by the Department of Health and Welfare for termination of his parental rights. The
magistrate denied the application and instead appointed counsel to represent the father and directed
that the father could testify by way of a telephone deposition. The father asserted that the denial of
his request to be personally present at the hearing was a deprivation of due process. The Idaho Court
of Appeals concluded that the father's due process rights were not violated because he was allowed
to present testimony by way of telephone deposition. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court
enumerated several factors appropriate for consideration in balancing the private and governmental
interests at stake when an inmate seeks to appear personally in court in a civil proceeding:
[TJhe trial court may take into account the costs and inconvenience of
transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the courtroom,
any potential danger of security risk which the presence of a particular
inmate would pose to the court, the substantiality of the matter at issue,
the need for an early determination of the matter, the possibility of
delaying trial until the prisoner is released, the probability of success on
the merits, the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of the
inmate presenting his testimony in person rather than by deposition.
Baby Doe, 130 Idaho at 52,936 P.2d at 695 (quoting In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979)
If, in balancing these interests, the trial court concludes that they do not weigh in the

favor of allowing a prisoner to appear personally, the court should then consider alternative means
by which the prisoner's right to be heard may be honored. See Baby Doe, supra. Such alternatives
include the appearance of the inmate by telephone. State v. Valentine, 190 Ariz. 107,945 P.2d 828
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1997); State ex rel Christie v. Husz, 217 \Vis.2d 593, 579 N.W.2d 243, 246
(Wis.Ct.App.1998).

The trial court has discretion to fashion an approach that best suits the

particular circumstance.
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Further, in Demoran v. F.A. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9 th Cir. 1986), an inmate appealed the
granting of summary judgment because he was denied an opportunity to appear at the summary
judgment hearing. At the time of the hearing, Demoran was an inmate at the county jail. The Court
held that, "a plaintiff in a civil suit who is confined in state prison at the time of a hearing has no
absolute right to appear personally. Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9 th Cir. 1970) (Because
Demoran had notice of the hearing and submitted a written memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to attend.) See
Demoran, 781 F.2d 155 at 158 (9 th Cir. 1985)
As shown by excerpts of the record above, the district judge denied Roles' motion to
be present in the courtroom to argue his opposition to summary judgment. In denying Roles' request
to be transferred, the court found that there was a security concern in transferring Roles, who was
serving a life sentence for serious sex offenses including rape and penetration with a foreign object
The court also considered the cost the prison would incur every time an inmate files a civil matter
or initiates a civil case, which Mr. Roles has done in this case. Notwithstanding, Roles had
submitted a brief opposing summary judgment, and he was allowed to participate at the summary
judgment hearing by way of telephone.

Therefore, Roles has failed to show that a due process

violation occurred.
Further, Roles has asserted that the during the summary judgment hearing, the
telephone at the prison was cutting in and out, and he was unable to hear the entire argument at the
hearing. He argues that when he attempted to bring this matter to the judge's attention, he was told
by the judge that he did not have permission to speak. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 22) The record does
not support Roles' version of events. A copy of the reporter's transcript is part of the record, and no
where within transcript is there any indication that Roles was not able to hear due to complications
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with the telephone reception. In fact, reading through the transcript it is quite apparent through the
multiple exchanges between Roles and Judge Neville that Roles was able to hear, comprehend, and
quickly reply to all statements made to him by the court. The transcript is devoid of any request by
Roles for the judge or Respondent's counsel to repeat anything said due to the alleged telephone
reception cutting in and out. "A litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and
later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal. Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 644
P.2d 255,357 (1982). In addition, "[s]ubstantive issues will not be considered for the first time on
appeal." Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509 at 512, 181 P.3d 435 at 438 (Idaho, 2007). The
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on
appeal." Id.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure40(d)(2)(A)( 4) provides that a judge maybe disqualified
from presiding in any action where "the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any
party or the case in the action." A judge's determination that disqualification is not necessary will
be disturbed on appeal only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520,529,
835 P.2d 1331, 1340 (Ct. App. 1992). Here, as explained in more detail above, Judge Neville
made an exhaustive clarification on the record detailing the multiple reasons why he was denying
Roles' request to be present for the hearing. Further, Roles was able to appear by way of telephone,
which is a suitable alternative to preserve Roles' right to be heard. State v. Valentine, 190 Ariz. 107,
945 P.2d 828 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1997). Further, adverse rulings, by themselves, do not demonstrate
disqualifying bias. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 530, 835 P.2d 1331, 1341 (Ct.App.1992)
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IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons and well settled Idaho law, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Roles' Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint on summary judgment.
Accordingly, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affirm the dismissal of Roles' Prisoner
Civil Rights Complaint.
DATED this 27th day of December, 2011.
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